Salmon
and Gluckstein Revisited
Part Six
By Kristin Ann High
September 2019
Click
here for Part Five.
The Ships
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were ordered and laid down as improved
Panzerschiffe—the
Germans originally designated them as Panzerschiffe
'D' and 'E', respectively. The path through
which the improved Panzerschiffe became Schlachtshiffe
'D' (Scharnhorst) and 'E' (Gneisenau), is
complicated by factors as disparate as evolving
German naval doctrine, the political manœuvering
of the Great Powers in Europe, and the always-present
effect of escalation in naval armaments among
those Great Powers.
The Panzerschiffe
The inaugural event
was the German reinvention of the armoured
cruiser [1] with the building of Panzerschiffe
'A' (Deutschland) and 'B' (Admiral Graf Spee) between 1929 and 1934 [2]. The
German Panzerschiff means "armoured
ship," and is disingenuously close to
Küstenpanzerschiffe, the armoured coast
defence ships of the old German Navy [3].
The Panzerschiffe, however, were in no sense
coast defence ships. Built for endurance,
high speed, and superior acceleration, their
main engines were not steam-driven turbines,
but 9-cylinder MAN diesels providing 54,000
brake horsepower (bhp) for a flank speed
of 26 knots [4]. Not only did the two-stroke
double-action diesels give the Panzerschiffe
a wartime cruising range in the neighbourhood
of 17,000 nm, they provided superior acceleration
to steam-driven turbines, which could be
decisive in the opening moments of a surface
action. They were also easier to maintain
and repair than steam turbines, an important
consideration for a navy having no overseas
bases.
The Panzerschiffe
were armed for commerce warfare. Although
their main battery was much heavier than
that of any cruiser, neither the number
of rifles, nor their arrangement, was oriented
towards surface action against warships.
The six 11"/52-calibre C.28
main battery rifles were carried in two triple
LC.28 turrets [5], one foreward and one aft.
This was ample for dealing with auxiliary
cruisers and armed merchant ships, sufficient
for dealing with the older cruisers likely
to be guarding a convoy, and adequate for
handling modern light cruisers.
The secondary battery
comprised eight 5.9"/55-calibre
C.28 rifles, in eight single MPL.28 shielded
pedestal mounts, while the tertiary battery
comprised six 4.1"/65-calibre C.33 dual-purpose
rifles in three dual LC.31 shielded pedestal
mounts. The Panzerschiffe also carried a
fairly robust ack-ack mount for 1930s-era
ships, with eight 37mm/83-calibre HACN and
ten 20mm/65-calibre C.30 LACN [6].
Lastly, the Panzerschiffe were fit with eight
21" torpedo
tubes in two quadruple-tube mounts, and all
carried two floatplanes with an athwartships
catapult.
The principal weakness in a surface action
was the siting of the main battery turrets
fore and aft, which meant that escorts, likely
to be in superior numbers, could overwhelm
the ship's main battery by attacking the
raider from both beams. The secondary battery
was heavy enough for use against destroyers
and light cruisers, but the weapons were
poorly sited and lacked protection. The tertiary
battery was rather light, and it, too, was
poorly sited and lacking in crew protection.
The Panzerschiffe were not heavily armoured,
depending on speed and firepower for most
of their protection. With their high flank
speed, the Panzerschiffe were fast enough
to outrun existing British, Italian, and
French battleships. The only ships both numerous
enough to serve as convoy escorts and fast
enough to outrun the Panzerschiffe were light
cruisers, and against these ships the Panzerschiffe
counted on their superior acceleration to
keep the range open long enough for their
heavy main battery rifles to shatter the
poorly armoured enemy ships. Against multiple
cruisers the Panzerschiffe might find the
ranges dropping, but their armour protection
was proof against the 6-inch rifles comprising
the main battery of the British and French
light cruisers [7], and against the light
cruisers and auxiliary cruisers (armed passenger
ships) of both Allies.
In the event, this
scheme proved to be the largely successful—at
The Plate, the armour protection of Admiral
Graf Spee defeated the fire of Ajax and Achilles, despite seventeen hits, while
the auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay proved
no match for Admiral Scheer. Against lighter
warships like destroyers, trawlers, and
sloops, the speed, power, and protection
of the Panzerschiffe were simply overwhelming
[8].
Treaty cruisers [9],
armed with 8-inch main batteries [10],
proved to be rather more difficult. Although
the Germans believed their armour plate
was sufficiently strong to prevent an intact
8" APC round reaching
the vitals of a Panzerschiff, experience
proved otherwise. At The Plate, Exeter—a
modified “County”-class treaty
cruiser—scored a hit on Admiral Graf
Spee that penetrated the main belt and
both interior armoured bulkheads before exploding,
just missing the machinery spaces. But treaty
cruisers were at a distinct disadvantage
against a Panzerschiff, as their armour protection
was in no way able to withstand the German
ships' main battery, which also gave the
German ship the advantage in range. At The
Plate, Exeter was battered almost to ruin
before Admiral Graf Spee ceased firing on
her, and she was able only to land three
hits against the German ship.
The only ships clearly superior to the Panzerschiffe
were the old enemy of German armoured cruisers,
Royal Navy battlecruisers. But the once-mighty
Battle Cruiser Fleet was now reduced to three
ships, Renown, Repulse, and Hood. Of the
three, only Renown could comprehensively
dominate a Panzerschiff in the open sea,
having superior speed, a heavier main battery,
and enough armour protection to batter the
Panzerschiff to pieces before the German
ship could close within effective range of
its main battery. Repulse and Hood could
probably match the speed of a Panzerschiff,
but it is an open question as to whether
they could have run her down.
More importantly, under the terms of the
Treaty of Versailles, the Germans were permitted
to build up to eight such ships, while the
terms of the Washington Naval Treaty prohibited
Great Britain from building more battlecruisers,
even had the funds been available, and the
political will to build such ships at hand.
The immediate answer to the Panzerschiffe
thus came from the Third Republic.
Scharnhorst in early 1939.
Dunkerque and Strasbourg
The French ships Dunkerque and Strasbourg were laid down
after the first two German Panzerschiffe,
and they were clearly intended to answer
the threat of those ships. Although most
sources credit the French ships with being
the progenitors of the fast battleship,
a close reading of their construction details—the
ships were as heavy as contemporaneous battleships,
and as heavily armed as most of those battleships,
yet they were 8 to 10 knots faster than any
battleship then at sea—shows the unmistakable
signs of their ancestry.
Jacky Fisher's navy
coined the term that still applies to such
a ship, and the French employed it for
the design studies that were the precursors
of the new ships—Croiseur
de Combat, the battlecruiser. They bought their
speed at the price of armour protection—the
very definition of the Croiseur de Combat.
The first step of
escalation was clear in the French battlecruisers—though the
French themselves always classed the ships
as battleships—as they were significantly
heavier than the Panzerschiffe, at 35,500
tons as against 16,200 tons [11], while still
being faster—both French ships could
make 30 knots over eight hours on 114,050
shaft horsepower (shp), easily 4 knots faster
than the German ships could manage at full
power.
The French ships
were also much better armed, mounting eight
13"/50-calibre M.1933
main battery rifles in two quadruple turrets
[12], both mounted foreward. They had a numerous,
though somewhat light, secondary battery
of sixteen 5.1"/45-calibre M.1932 Dual-Purpose
rifles in three quadruple turrets and two
dual turrets, with these batteries capable
of strong concentration aft. Most sources
consider the two ships' secondary battery
to be the first dual-pupose weapons, though
they seem to have been prone to jamming and
crew fatigue under the high rate-of-fire
conditions obtaining for ack-ack. The two
ships were fit with eight 37mm/50-calibre
M.1933 HACN in four twin mounts, and carried
thirty-two 13mm/76-calibre Hotchkiss M.1929
HMG in eight quadruple mounts.
Their armour was
intended to be proof against the German
11-inch rifles arming the Panzerschiffe—and
thus also the 8-inch rifles arming treaty
cruisers. The main belt was inclined, to
increase its resistance to penetration while
saving weight. The French ships' 13-inch
rifles could defeat the German ships' armour
at all ranges, while the German 11-inch C.28
rifles did not start to become a threat until
the range had fallen to below 18,000 yards.
With a 4 knot speed advantage, the French
ships could work the range until they began
to find the Panzerschiff, and then set about
methodically demolishing it as they closed
in.
The French ships also boasted extensive
and sophisticated anti-torpedo protection
as an integral part of their design, rather
than as a compensating measure for excessive
topweight then adapted to torpedo protection,
as was the case with many Great War-era dreadnoughts
and their modernization schemes.
The German ships
remained superior in endurance and acceleration,
but acceleration is only relevant if it
can be used to achieve separation. If the
Panzerschiff could shake the French ships,
however, it had the cruising endurance
to wait the bigger, faster French ships
out—especially
as it could later rendezvous with the network
of German supply ships hiding at sea.
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
The Germans were
not slow to respond to the threat of the
French ships, and the resulting designs
provoked something of a controversy in
the German government and Navy. The Navy
wanted a direct answer to the French ships—a
more conventional warship with heavier armament
and better armour protection. The Reich government,
now headed by Adolph Hitler, wanted a more
heavily protected Panzerschiff. The Navy
won, mostly.
The two ships to
counter the French battlecruisers were
officially improved Panzerschiffe, needed
to "match" Dunkerque and Strasbourg.
The British, who had decided upon a unilateral
naval arrangement with Germany, were satisfied
with this justification, and that satisfaction
was sufficient for Hitler's ends.
In some ways, the
two German ships were scaled-up versions
of the Panzerschiffe. They added a superfiring
turret foreward to carry nine main battery
rifles in three triple turrets, as against
the six in the Panzerschiffe, but those
rifles were still 11-inch, albeit the newer
11"/55-calibre
C.34 model. They carried more numerous secondary
and tertiary batteries, and these were sited
better, but the rifles themselves were the
same—and the secondary battery still
suffered from poor arrangement, with two
sets of single-purpose rifles intermixed.
Armour protection was improved considerably,
but was still not sufficient to defeat the
French 13-inch rifles, and deck armour remained
weak. The new ships were two to four knots
faster, about equal to the French ships.
There were costs
associated with the additional armament,
increased armour, and improved speed. The
new ships were almost twice as heavy as
the Panzerschiffe, at 38,100 tons deep
load displacement, and about the same as
the French ships and two of the three British
battlecruisers—Hood, at 48,360
tons deep load, being the exception.
To move that weight at 30+ knots required
a conventional steam power plant, in place
of the economical diesels. Endurance fell
by almost half, to around 9,000 nm on 6,200
tons of fuel oil, while the steam plant made
maintenance and repairs almost impossible
at sea. In addition, the new German high-pressure
steam plants were unreliable, making the
need for frequent maintenance pressing, and
increasing the risk of breakdowns necessitating
repair.
Although the new
ships were more powerful surface warships
than the Panzerschiffe, they were not well-suited
for commerce raiding, particularly beyond
reach of friendly ports. On the other hand,
in the surface warfare rôle, they
were inferior to both the new French ships
and the older British battlecruisers, as
their 11-inch rifles were less powerful
than the French 13-inch and British 15-inch
rifles.
The one fight the
Navy lost, was in regard to the main battery.
The Navy had wanted to fit the 15"/52-calibre C.34 rifle,
in three dual-mount turrets, giving Scharnhorst and Gneisenau a main battery equal to that
of the French and British ships. The Reich
government worried that the adoption of 15-inch
rifles would alarm Great Britain, and insisted
on retention of the 11" rifles.
The Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935
permitted main battery weapons of up to 16-inch,
whereupon the Reich government ordered the
Navy to fit the 15-inch C.34 rifles to the
new ships, which were now officially Schlachtshiff.
The government promptly reversed itself
upon learning that the turrets to mount the
15-inch rifles would take some time to develop
and produce; the two new Schlachtshiffe would
have the 11-inch C.34 rifles after all, with
the understanding that the more powerful
15-inch C.34 rifles would be used to re-arm
both ships as soon as possible.
Scharnhorst firing on British carrier Glorious,
June 1940.
Rearming a warship, rather than replacing
older models of a rifle with newer models,
is a much more complicated proposition than
might first appear. Almost everything about
the main battery is involved in such a change.
Even given that the turret mounts were constructed
to accommodate the heavier battery, rearming Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was not a simple
matter of dropping in six new 15-inch rifles
and their new turrets. For the German ships,
building in this future possibility meant
making design trade-offs during their building.
A triple-mount LC.34
turret for the 11"/54-calibre
C.34 rifle weighed 827 tons complete. A twin
LC.34 for the 15"/52-calibre C.34 rifle
weighed 1,160 tons complete. The turrets
thus imposed a design burden of 3,480 tons
as against 2,481 tons, making for a net increase
of 999 tons.
The 11-inch C.34
rifles fired an APC round—PzSpgr— weighing
727.5 lbs., and an HE/SAP round—Spgr—weighing
694.5 lbs [13]. Both shells took a total
propellent charge of 535.7 lbs. (262.4 lbs.
of propellent and 273.3 lbs. of brass casing
for the main charge). The main magazines
could carry up to 150 rounds per rifle, so
a load of 100 PzSpgr and 50 Spgr weighs approximately
94 tons. For nine rifles in three triple
turrets, this yields a total weight of 846
tons of ammunition.
The 15-inch C.34
rifles fired an APC and an HE/SAP round
both weighing 1,764 lbs. Both shells took
a total propellent charge of 621.4 lbs.
(467.4 lbs. of propellent and 154 lbs.
of brass casing for the "main
charge"), for a 15-inch round weight
of 2,385.4 lbs. complete. The main magazines
could carry up to 130 rounds per rifle, for
a weight of approximately 155 tons (310,102
lbs.) per rifle. With eight rifles in four
twin turrets, this yields a total weight
of 1,240 tons of ammunition.
The difference in shell weights thus reduced
the ammunition supply by roughly twenty rounds
per ship. Full ammunition load for the 11-inch
ammunition was 846 tons as against 1,240
tons for the 15-inch, making for a net increase
of 394 tons.
Together, the additional weight of turrets
and ammunition imposed a build burden of
an additional 1,393 tons.
"As soon as possible",
turned out to be never [14], but the possibility
existed, nonetheless. Plans were in hand
for both ships to be re-armed from the availability
of the first turrets, in 1939. The ships
would have then be nearly as potent with
their main battery as were Bismarck and Tirpitz,
allowing some leeway for the heavier ships'
superiority as a gun platform, and the additional
turret aft.
The Kriegsmarine
had been primarily a policy tool wielded
by the German Government in its efforts
to absorb Austria, reclaim territories
lost at Versailles, and recover the status
of a Great Power. The Kriegsmarine was useful
in this respect both as presenting a "gentleman's
face" for the Nazi State—particularly
towards Great Britain—and as potential
maritime threat to the Third Republic, which
that nation must answer.
The outbreak of war
in September 1939 rendered what passed
for subtlety in German diplomacy moot.
Once the general European war began, the
vast building programmes for the Kriegsmarine
were pushed to the bottom of the priorities
list—behind even automobiles and similar
consumer items, the production of which,
in the Allied countries, were almost immediately
suspended.
There were three
periods when the two ships might conceivably
have been re-armed. The first, and probably
the best from the point of view of the
ships themselves, was during the winter
of 1938–1939, when both
ships were having "clipper" bows
refit. The second was during the ten-month
long period they were in Brest between March
1941 and January 1942. The final opportunity
came during the yard periods for repairs
necessitated by the failure of Operation
Cerberus [15] in February of 1942. It was
during this last that plans for Gneisenau's
re-arming were briefly advanced.
The ships were in
German yards, in peacetime, during 1938–1939, and the new turrets
and their rifles could have been ready at
least by the end of their yard periods. The
priority for the 15-inch turrets in 1938–1939
lay with Bismarck and Tirpitz, and though
there is a definite argument to be made in
favour of putting off completion of the two
big ships in order to re-arm the more flexible Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the political
position of the Kriegsmarine made it unlikely
such practicality would win out over the
prestige of completing a pair of 50,000-ton
battleships.
The long period in Brest offered the best
possibilities in terms of the availability
of yards and skilled workers, once the war
began. But the ships in Brest were poorly
protected by the Luftwaffe in France, and
any move to re-arm them would almost certainly
have intensified the air attacks on them,
and possibly precipitated a Commando attack.
The logistical obstacles of installing German
turrets and rifles on German heavy ships
in French yards is not lightly dismissed,
either.
The last period, when the ships were being
repaired in Germany after the disaster of
the Channel Dash, has the fact that such
a move was actually planned for Gneisenau to its credit. On the debit side is the fact
that Gneisenau was condemned to a meaningless
twilight during that very period, despite
having suffered damage that was repairable.
The German surface fleet was a political
orphan in a mismanaged economy. With the
East devouring war production of all kinds,
and the focus of the German government almost
exclusively filtered through the lens of
that front, there was little enough hope
for the surface fleet in Norway, much less
those ships still in, or forced to return
to, German waters.
In all probability,
there is very little short of a major surface
success that could have provided the Kriegsmarine
with the kind of political capital it needed
to re-arm Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and
had such capital existed, it is not at
all certain that it would have gone to
the re-arming of the two ships. Raeder
continued to press for Graf Zeppelin to
be completed, despite the Kriegsmarine's
utter lack of experience operating aircraft
carriers, and the obstructionism of the Luftwaffe—which
could not meet even part of its existing
operational responsibilities, much less take
on more.
Scharnhorst at sea, fall
1940.
End Notes
[1] The German is
quite specific. Schlachtshiffe means literally "battle ships" (the
singular is Schlachtshiff), while Schlachtkreuzer
means literally "battle cruiser" (the
plural is Schlachtkreuzeren). Great War-era
armoured cruisers like Admiral Graf von Spee's
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were Großer
Kreuzer, literally "great cruiser".
Light cruisers like von Spee's Leipzig, Nürnberg,
and Dresden were Kleiner Kreuzer, literally "small
cruiser". With the emergence of the
8-inch "treaty cruiser" after the
Washington Naval Treaty, cruisers became
generally divided into light and heavy types,
principally based on their main battery.
The German for "light cruiser" was
Leichter Kreuzer, literally "light cruiser",
and the "heavy cruiser" was Schwerer
Kreuzer, literally "heavy cruiser" (the
plurals are Leichter Kreuzeren, and Schwerer
Kreuzeren, respectively).
[2] The two French
ships provided the Reich government—now led by Adolph Hitler—with
the political justification to build Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau necessary in the German Chancellor's
view to keep relations with Great Britain
friendly. Although the French protested violently
over the two German "improved" Panzerschiffe,
the British concluded a unilateral Naval
Treaty with Germany.
[3] While the popular
notion of summing up "weight-of-broadside" to calculate
fleet power is fallacious—firing nine
2,000 lbs. shells "sends a massive broadside
of 18,000 lbs. of steel hurling towards the
enemy", but unless a shell hits, this
impressive feat amounts to 0 lbs. of steel
on target—the weight of an individual
shell is of the first order of importance
in surface naval warfare, for it determines
the armour penetration and bursting charge
capacity of the shell.
[4] The Befehlshaber
der Aufklärungsstreitkräfte
(BdA), the commander of reconnaissance ships
or forces; a commodore commanding light forces
employed to scout or screen heavy ships.
[5] These ships are
known by a great many names, but their
general lines are the same—merchant
hulls, commonly passenger ships or large
freighters, armed with a miscellany of old
naval rifles and perhaps some depth charges
or torpedoes, commanded by retired or passed-over
regular Navy officers, with the remaining
crew usually Reservists.
The German merchant
raiders were called Handels-Stör-Kreuzer (HSK), "commerce
disruption cruisers"; the Royal Navy
employed the term Auxiliary Cruiser, although
many later British histories use the term
Auxiliary Merchant Cruiser (the German histories
use Hilfskreuzer, "auxiliary cruiser" for
the Allied ships); the most widely used term
is Armed Merchant Cruisers, and is from that
usage that the SWWAS Ship Type derives—AMC.
Whatever they were
called, they were no match for a warship—except perhaps
one crewed by Australians—and certainly
not for two battlecruisers.
[6] Two Panzerschiffe
had sortied from Germany during the crisis
of August, 1939, to take up waiting positions
in the Atlantic. These were Deutschland and Admiral Graf Spee. As is so often the
case in such situations, crews see what
they are expecting to see; Rawalpindi had
been told that the Admiralty believed—correctly as it turned out—that Deutschland was operating in the North Atlantic. Deutschland's first war cruise was desultory
at best, at least in part because the North
Atlantic was alive with Allied warships. Deutschland returned to Germany via the Färoes-Shetlands
Gap, anchoring in Gotenhafen 17th November
1939.
[7] Chronik des Seekrieges
1939-1945, by Jürgen Rohwer with Gerhard Hümmelchen,
Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Stuttgart,
2007. See also: "http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/chronik.htm#Z".
[8] Rohwer uses the
German Nordpolarmeer, literally North Polar
Sea; I believe this refers to the Norwegian
Sea, but it may be that the German ships
sailed into the extreme North of the North
Sea, rather than the southern portions
of the Arctic Ocean. Whatever the case,
the German ships sailed above the Arctic
Circle (Nordpolarkreis), a considerable distance
for two such short-legged ships to sail just
to "wait"—German sources
are also silent as to what Marschall was
waiting for.
[9] The heavy ships of the Home Fleet were
at Greenock, in The Clyde, after U.47 sank
Royal Oak in the Fleet anchorage at Scapa
Flow on 14th October 1939. There was thus
a slim but extant chance that a German ship
could slip through the Firth, though it would
have taken a good deal of luck to manage.
[10] Forbes served as C-in-C Home Fleet
until February of 1940, at which time he
was relieved by Acting Admiral Sir John Cronyn
Tovey; Forbes went to Plymouth as FOC Plymouth
Command, a typical assignment for a former
C-in-C Home Fleet before retirement. Forbes
got his DSO for actions at Jutland.
[11] Norway was Neutral at this stage of
the war, just as she had been in the Great
War. She was struggling to keep both the
Allies and the Germans from disregarding
her territorial waters, and she was largely
unsuccessful in her attempts.
[12] According to
German sources, Vizeadmiral Lütjens was Acting Flottenchef while
Admiral Marschall was on leave—possibly
sick leave—and Marshall resumed command
when he returned, on 23rd April. Exactly
what the nature of Lütjens appointment
as Flottenchef entailed is uncertain. Lütjens
was certainly Battle Fleet Commander between
11th March 1940, after the failure of Nordmark,
and 23rd April 1940, by which time the initial
naval operations in support of Weserübung
had completed. On 18th June 1940, Lütjens
again replaced Marschall, this time permanently.
[13] The German is
Kriegsschiffsgruppe, "warship
group".
[14] This is the popular name for the opening
phase of the Battle of Jutland, 31st May
1916, in which Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty's
Battle Cruiser Squadron engaged in a lengthy
gunnery battle with Vizeadmiral Franz Hipper's
Scouting Force. The Run To The South ended
when Beatty found that Hipper had led him
onto Admiral Reinhard Scheer's High Seas
Fleet. Beatty then repaid Hipper in the same
coin by starting the Run To The North.
[15] The Royal Navy's
Naval Staff History claims that Renown
struck Gneisenau on “A” turret— “Anton” in
German parlance—and disabled the mount.
German sources do not note this hit, nor
acknowledge any damage to Gneisenau's main
battery beyond that done to fire control
equipment. It is not impossible to reconcile
the two claims— Renown may have hit
Gneisenau on “Anton” and knocked
out its fire control equipment, or damaged
the linkage between “Anton” and
its DCT.
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Scharnhorst in
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