Panzer Grenadier: Kokoda Trail
Scenario Overview, Part 2
March 2014

Our summary of the scenarios in Kokoda Trail resumes. Part one covered the first 10 scenarios.

Scenario Eleven
Isurava: Day Three
29 August 1942

By the evening of the 28th, Brigadier Potts of the 21st Brigade had finally abandoned all hope of an offensive toward Kokoda. It had become apparent that his force was greatly outnumbered and several of his battalions were on their last legs. The only bright spot were the two companies of the 2/16 which had arrived and could provide support to the abysmal 53rd on the eastern track through Abuari. It appeared that the Japanese were beginning to apply pressure in that area as well.

Conclusion

The 39th and 2/14th Battalions were still in position at Isurava at the close of the day’s battle, but the position had become untenable. A large number of Japanese had managed to flank the position and the 39th Battalion had reached the end of their usefulness as a combat force. Lt. Col. Keys and Lt. Col. Honner had no choice but to consider abandoning their positions, and moved during the night back to Alola and The Rest House. Fighting along the eastern trail had also increased throughout the day, and while the 2/16th had managed to hold the section of the trail that ran from Alola to Abuari it was apparent that they would also need to pull back the following day.

Commentary

As of the third day of the battle, most of the Australian forces on the board are from the veteran 21st Brigade. But the Japanese have taken control of part of the eastern trail along with two villages, so they’re in a better tactical situation than in the previous Isurava scenarios.

Scenario Twelve
Isurava: The Retreat
30 August 1942

During the night of 29–30 August, Brigadier Potts began his attempt to disengage his forces and retreat up through the Kokoda Gap. Early in the evening the spent 39th Battalion retreated up the trail followed by the ineffective 53rd Battalion. The 2/14th pulled-back to the Isurava Rest House and was ordered to make a fighting withdrawal against any Japanese pursuit, while the 2/16th was ordered to set up farther to the rear in Alola and act as a rearguard for 2/14th as that battalion passed through its lines. The 2/16th was to be the last out of the area. But unknown to the Australians, Gen. Horii had also adjusted his forces and turned to Yazawa Detachment (two battalions of the 41st Infantry Regiment) to continue the attack against the weakened Australians.

Conclusion

By the end of the fourth day the Australians were in full retreat back toward the Gap, having managed to extricate the bulk of their forces. Their next stand would be on the southern slope of the Owen Stanley Mountains. Maj. Gen. Horii assigned the newly-arrived 41st Regiment to lead the pursuit, confident that once the gap was reached it would be a simple matter to descend the other side and capture Port Moresby.

Commentary

This is an Australian withdrawal-under-fire where the Japanese have to stop the Aussies from exiting the south edge of the board.Both sides score VPs for killing enemy steps and exiting friendly steps off the south edge, and that will force the Aussies to fight a rearguard action: they’ve got to slow the Japanese advance so they get more steps off the south edge than the Japanese do, while the Japanese will have to engage and push past the Australian roadblocks.

Scenario Thirteen
Delaying Tactics, Part One
2 September 1942

After Isurava, while Brigadier Potts tried to find a new defensive position and get more fresh troops up the trail from Port Moresby, Maj. Gen. Horii assigned the two newly-arrived battalions of 41st Regiment to lead the pursuit of the Australians and keep the pressure on. With supplies dwindling and events on Guadalcanal coming to a head, he needed this campaign decided soon.

Conclusion

Though they kept the Japanese busy in several running battles through the Kokoda Gap, the Australians were unable to put any distance between them and the Japanese before reaching their next defensive line at Efogi.

Commentary

Here one under-strength Australian battalion sets up on the board while another enters the south edge at the same time two full-strength Japanese battalions enter the north edge. The on-board Aussie force must try to hold back the Japanese force (which is more than three times their size) long enough for their reinforcements to catch up and form whatever defensive lines they can to protect the VP-producing village hexes on the board.

Scenario Fourteen
Australian Pursuit
3 September 1942

On September 1st the 18th Brigade was brought forward to pursue the retreating Japanese. It did not take long for the Australians to discover just how difficult it was to advance against the Japanese.

Conclusion

From 1 to 5 September the Australians engaged the Japanese in a series of running battles and gradually pushed them back into their landing areas. During the nights of September 4th and 5th, the Japanese were evacuated by naval ships.

Commentary

Here an outnumbered but higher-morale Japanese force can set up hidden and use hidden movement to stop a pursuing Australian force. The Australians are pretty tough themselves, and resilient in the face of Japanese ambushes.

Scenario Fifteen
Delaying Tactics, Part Two
4 September 1942

In early September, the Australian success at Milne Bay and the continued presence of U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal created new options for the Allies while causing new problems for the Japanese. As a result, 2/27th Battalion was finally released from reserve in Port Moresby and allowed to move up the trail to join the rest of 21st Brigade. Brigadier Potts’ plan was to use 2/27th to establish a new defensive position at the Efogi Spur which his retreating troops could move into. But with Japanese troops closing rapidly on Efogi, the Australians would have to delay them for a full day to let 2/27th get into position.

Conclusion

Although the 2/14th and 2/16th attempted to hold the Japanese at several points, they were unable to break contact with the Japanese until September 4th. The 2/27th would arrive at the new position on the Efogi Spur only shortly before the retreating Australian forces.

Commentary

Unlike Part One, here all the Aussies get to set up on the board, but they’ve got to cover two different north-south trails and all the villages along them while the Japanese still outnumber them two-to-one. The Japanese have plenty of time to wear down the lower-morale Australians, so holding back the Japanese will be tough.

Scenario Sixteen
Missionary Ridge, Day One
7 September 1942

By the afternoon of September 6th, Brigadier Potts finally had the entire 21st Brigade together on Missionary Ridge above Efogi village. Two of his battalions (2/14th and 2/16th) had been greatly weakened by the battles at Isurava, and reinforcements were far too slow in coming. But time was running out for Maj. Gen. Horii as well; he had already received orders calling off the attack on Port Moresby in favor of establishing a firm “strategic line.” Only the loose nature of the orders allowed him to continue his advance as far as Efogi. On the 7th, his 41st Regiment made an initial probe of the Australian position.

Conclusion

The Australian defenses held as the 41st Regiment moved into position and began a probing assault. It would be the next day before the Japanese could make a concentrated attack that would tell the tale.

Commentary

It's another fighting withdrawal, with the Australians hoping to get their troops down the trail without suffering too many casualties in the process. The apanese, of course, hope to stop them or at least make them pay for any success..

Scenario Seventeen
Missionary Ridge, Day Two
8 September 1942

Once again, further Australian reinforcements were on the trail but would not arrive for the second day of battle at Missionary Ridge. Instead the Allied commanders in Port Moresby arranged for air support in an attempt to hold back the Japanese. Maj. Gen. Horii, upon realizing that the Australians had decided to stand and fight here, ordered the I and II Battalion of the 144th Regiment to swing wide in a flanking maneuver while the 41st Regiment continued the main assault.

Conclusion

Thanks to air support from Port Moresby, the Australian defenses held until I Battalion of the 144th Regiment arrived in the rear of the Australian positions. The relatively unengaged troops of the 2/14th and 2/16th managed to escape, while the bulk of the 2/27th was surrounded and destroyed. Although only one of his flanking battalions arrived in time to affect the battle, Maj. Gen. Horii was now confident enough to continue the advance toward Port Moresby.

Commentary

This one’s fought on the same battlefield as Day One and the Japanese must attack up the ridge again, but here the Japanese begin the game with forces nearly equal to the Australians and they also get reinforcements who can attack the Australian rear partway through the game. That makes it a very tough situation for the Australians, though they can exit the board once they’ve taken a certain amount of damage which can help them deny the Japanese one of their objectives.

Scenario Eighteen
Ioribaiwa, Day One
13 September 1942

After several days of delaying attacks and ambushes against the advancing Japanese by the tattered remnants of 21st Brigade, the battle approached Ioribaiwa Ridge where Brigadier Eather had assembled all three battalions of 25th Brigade as well as the reserve 3rd Battalion from Maroubra Force. The Australians were set to counterattack on September 14th, but Maj. Gen. Horii acted first and ordered the depleted II Battalion of 41st Regiment to attack across the creek bottom. Unfortunately for him, the Japanese walked into an ambush manned by the remaining soldiers of the 2/14 and 2/16th Battalions.

Conclusion

In the final battle of the long withdrawal from Efogi, the composite 2/14th and 2/16th Battallion held the creek crossing until nightfall allowing Brigadier Eather to proceed with his planned counterattacks the next day. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Horii ordered all his remaining troops into a renewed offensive on the next day as well.

Commentary

Here’s a short ambush scenario in which the remnants of two Australian battalions must keep a Japanese battalion from making a creek crossing. The tired, disorganized Australians can set up half their units hidden but cannot use hidden movement, so they need to deploy carefully and use their on-board units to lure the Japanese into traps set by their off-board units.

Scenario Nineteen
Ioribaiwa, Day Two
14 September 1942

Promptly at 0800 on the 14th of September the Australian 25th Brigade launched its flanking attack down off Ioribaiwa Ridge, the 2/31st was on the left flank and the 2/33rd on the right flank. The composite 2/14th and 2/16th in the center was ordered slowly retreat back up onto the ridge and draw the advancing Japanese in the trap. The Japanese had plans of their own however, and launched a broad frontal attack at the same time using all their remaining troops.

Conclusion

Before even reaching the bottom of the ridge, the 2/31st and 2/33rd encountered strong Japanese forces attacking toward them. The battle quickly changed into a desperate defense of the ridgeline by the Australians. At close of day the Australians were still holding a line across the face of the ridge but the battle was undecided.

Commentary

Here Australian forces arrayed along a ridge run into a very large Japanese force deployed for a frontal assault across the creek. The Australians have plenty of forces but they must defend two different hills and a central trail against Japanese attacks, while the Japanese get to set up after the Australians so they can concentrate their forces wherever they wish. Given slow movement rates in the jungle, it will be tough for the Aussies to reinforce whichever point the Japanese choose as the first objective of their attack.

Scenario Twenty
Ioribaiwa, Day Three
15 September 1942

Both sides lost their nerve as the third day of battle began. Brigadier Eather (worried that his Australians could no longer hold the ridge) asked for permission to withdraw and received orders to hold the ridge for “as long as possible,” but also allowing him to decide when it was “no longer possible”. He then promptly ordered a withdrawal. For his part, Maj. Gen. Horii decided this was the “Strategic Line” of his orders, and ordered the battalions of the 41st regiment to begin the march back over the Owen Stanleys through Kokoda Gap.

Conclusion

Although the fighting continued on a smaller scale, both the Japanese and Australians sides withdrew the bulk of the forces during the day and the Japanese were left in temporary possession of Ioribaiwa Ridge. At the end of a very long and nonfunctional supply line, they would hold it only as long as the Australians chose not to attack in force.

Commentary

After two days of desperate battle all along the ridge, the Australians are badly dispersed in the jungle and communications between them have broken down. They therefore must set up spread out and start the scenario with a low initiative, and they are subject to the Fog of War optional rule while the Japanese are not. The Aussies score VPs by eliminating Japanese steps and getting their own units off the south edge, and all the restrictions on the Australians will make that an appropriately tough job.

That’s all for Part Two. Part Three covers the Australian counteroffensive against the Japanese forces in New Guinea including the battles around Templeton’s Crossing, Eora Creek and Gorari, and the clearing of Goodenough Island.

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