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Midway Deluxe Edition:
Kimmel’s War Plan: WPPac-46

By Christopher Cafiero
June 2021

One of the great features of Second World War at Sea is the ability of players to examine why a particular campaign or battle went the way it did. Alternate orders of battle can also allow players to explore various alternatives: what if the Bismarck sortied with Tirpitz, what would the Soviets had done with a more powerful Black Sea Fleet, and so forth. Like its cousin Great War at Sea, Second World War at Sea is also a terrific laboratory to test the belligerent powers’ war plans. One can imagine Japanese and American planners in 1941 sitting down with their copies of Second World War at Sea and trying to come up with the best opening moves in a long-considered Pacific war. This article will try to do just that by taking a look at War Plan WPPac-46, the actual war plan devised by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and his staff in response to a Pacific War initiated by Japan.

By 1941 the U.S. had abandoned its various itinerations of the “Orange” plan and replaced them with the “Rainbow” war plans, which took into account not just the Pacific, but a global, coalition war against the Axis powers. Early on it became apparent to most planners that a proper strategy was “Germany First,” correctly deducing that she was not only the most dangerous Axis power, but that her defeat likely precluded victory by any other Axis power. As a result, substantial U.S. naval forces were allocated to the Atlantic; in 1941 the U.S. Atlantic Fleet had all modern U.S. battleships, several older ones, and at least three aircraft carriers among other assets.


Admiral Kimmel in 1941.

 

Complicating matters however, was the great unresolved problem of the “Orange” plan. Specifically, “Orange” never fully settled the question as to whether the U.S. Navy should storm west at the onset of hostilities, relieve and protect the Philippines, and seek a “decisive battle” with the Imperial Japanese Navy; or if it should recognize that this strategy simply played to Japanese strengths, and instead plan a multi-year offensive through the Central Pacific to grind the Imperial Navy down on the way to a final blockade of the Japanese Islands. As different factions gained and lost influence, “Orange” wavered between these two incompatible concepts.

The acceptance of the “Rainbow” plans made the direct attack west, often referred to as the “Through Ticket” offensive, essentially moot, as neither the bases nor resources for the “Through Ticket” offensive existed. When Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was given command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941 he was also given the difficult assignment of crafting a plan that depreciated any thought of a rapid sortie to the Philippines, but nonetheless would have the U.S. Fleet undertaking offensive action to destroy the Imperial Japanese Navy and at least drain Japanese resources from attacks elsewhere.

Kimmel and his chief planner, Captain Charles “Soc” McMorris, developed several plans to satisfy these conflicting requirements, and eventually settled on plan WPPac-46, which was duly submitted to and approved by Washington. This is the plan that the Pacific Fleet would have initiated had it not been made moot by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

WPPac-46 anticipated a Japanese attack throughout the western Pacific, Philippines, Malaya, Borneo, and Indonesia (the so-called “Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere”), and assumed the U.S. would have some warning of Japanese intentions. Raids on U.S. bases such as Wake Island, and even Pearl Harbor itself, were considered, but deemed unlikely in view of the resources Japan needed to attack throughout this wide geographic area. Any direct attempt to relieve the Philippines was rejected because of lack of sufficient resources, lack of adequate and secure bases, and strong “Orange” air power (it should be noted that virtually all U.S. pre-war plans underestimated the strength and quality of Japanese airpower). However, Kimmel did plan a fairly aggressive response.

Under WPPac-46, the Pacific Fleet carrier groups would launch immediate raids on Japanese installations in the Marshall Islands. While exposing the carriers to land-based air attack, it was hoped that a sufficiently strong attack would lure the Imperial Fleet east in response. The carrier groups were not to commit to an all-out attack against Japanese bases, however, just raise a ruckus and retire eastwards.

Kimmel realized that the entire Japanese navy would not storm after the carriers—they would clearly be busy undertaking the offensive elsewhere—but he hoped “important units” would go east either to attack the raiding force, or knock out advance bases such as Guam, Wake Island, and perhaps Midway. If the Imperial Navy took the bait, the fleeing carriers would rendezvous with a support force of battleships and come about for a counter-attack against their pursuers (Yamamoto himself would try a similar ruse after the loss of his own carriers at the Battle of Midway). Additionally, the U.S. Battle Force would sortie if the chance for a “decisive battle” was in the offing (fuel requirements made it impossible to have the Battle Force simply “mill about” in hopes of a decisive encounter).

This plan is noteworthy in several respects. The U.S. did ultimately react to the Japanese attack with raids into the Marshall Islands, and the carriers did prove capable of defending themselves from the land-based air present there. The forward deployment of three battleships with a very small screen was risky: Until they linked up with the carriers they would clearly be susceptible to attack by submarine (one suspects Kimmel did not want to risk missing a fleet action, and in truth, Admiral Pye was an able subordinate to lead the Battle Force). Also of interest, the plan does not speculate much on the Japanese response other than to hope “important,” but undefined, units of the Imperial Fleet would respond.

By way of comparison, the Japanese strategy up until the planning of the Pearl Harbor attack is well known: Wait in the west for the U.S. offensive, perform attrition with light units and airpower, and shatter the U.S. Fleet in a decisive battle far from its bases. Had the Japanese command rejected the Pearl Harbor attack, this strategy might have very well prevailed, and the WPPac-46 offensive would have struck air; the Imperial Navy simply would have not responded in any appreciable force, and certainly not with “important units.” However, Admiral Yamamoto—assuming he was still in command—held strong views that the U.S. fleet should be destroyed as early and far east as possible.

Plan WPPac-46 plan appears in our Second World War at Sea: Midway Deluxe Edition game, where you can allow Yamamoto to take the opportunity for a early, decisive, battle with the Pacific Fleet.

You can order Midway Deluxe right here.

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