Midway Deluxe Edition:
Kimmel’s
War Plan: WPPac-46
By Christopher Cafiero
June 2021
One of the great features of Second
World War at Sea is the ability
of players to examine why a particular
campaign or battle went the way it did.
Alternate orders of battle can also allow
players to explore various alternatives:
what if the Bismarck sortied with Tirpitz,
what would the Soviets had done with a
more powerful Black Sea Fleet, and so forth.
Like its cousin Great
War at Sea, Second
World War at Sea is also a terrific laboratory
to test the belligerent powers’ war
plans. One can imagine Japanese and American
planners in 1941 sitting down with their
copies of Second
World War at Sea and trying
to come up with the best opening moves in
a long-considered Pacific war. This article
will try to do just that by taking a look
at War Plan WPPac-46, the actual war plan
devised by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and
his staff in response to a Pacific War initiated
by Japan.
By 1941 the U.S. had abandoned its various
itinerations of the “Orange” plan
and replaced them with the “Rainbow” war
plans, which took into account not just the
Pacific, but a global, coalition war against
the Axis powers. Early on it became apparent
to most planners that a proper strategy was “Germany
First,” correctly deducing that she
was not only the most dangerous Axis power,
but that her defeat likely precluded victory
by any other Axis power. As a result, substantial
U.S. naval forces were allocated to the Atlantic;
in 1941 the U.S. Atlantic Fleet had all modern
U.S. battleships, several older ones, and
at least three aircraft carriers among other
assets.
Complicating matters however, was the great
unresolved problem of the “Orange” plan.
Specifically, “Orange” never
fully settled the question as to whether
the U.S. Navy should storm west at the onset
of hostilities, relieve and protect the Philippines,
and seek a “decisive battle” with
the Imperial Japanese Navy; or if it should
recognize that this strategy simply played
to Japanese strengths, and instead plan a
multi-year offensive through the Central
Pacific to grind the Imperial Navy down on
the way to a final blockade of the Japanese
Islands. As different factions gained and
lost influence, “Orange” wavered
between these two incompatible concepts.
The acceptance of the “Rainbow” plans
made the direct attack west, often referred
to as the “Through Ticket” offensive,
essentially moot, as neither the bases nor
resources for the “Through Ticket” offensive
existed. When Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was
given command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on
1 February 1941 he was also given the difficult
assignment of crafting a plan that depreciated
any thought of a rapid sortie to the Philippines,
but nonetheless would have the U.S. Fleet
undertaking offensive action to destroy the
Imperial Japanese Navy and at least drain
Japanese resources from attacks elsewhere.
Kimmel and his chief planner, Captain Charles “Soc” McMorris,
developed several plans to satisfy these
conflicting requirements, and eventually
settled on plan WPPac-46, which was duly
submitted to and approved by Washington.
This is the plan that the Pacific Fleet would
have initiated had it not been made moot
by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
WPPac-46 anticipated a Japanese attack throughout
the western Pacific, Philippines, Malaya,
Borneo, and Indonesia (the so-called “Greater
Co-Prosperity Sphere”), and assumed
the U.S. would have some warning of Japanese
intentions. Raids on U.S. bases such as Wake
Island, and even Pearl Harbor itself, were
considered, but deemed unlikely in view of
the resources Japan needed to attack throughout
this wide geographic area. Any direct attempt
to relieve the Philippines was rejected because
of lack of sufficient resources, lack of
adequate and secure bases, and strong “Orange” air
power (it should be noted that virtually
all U.S. pre-war plans underestimated the
strength and quality of Japanese airpower).
However, Kimmel did plan a fairly aggressive
response.
Under WPPac-46, the Pacific Fleet carrier
groups would launch immediate raids on Japanese
installations in the Marshall Islands. While
exposing the carriers to land-based air attack,
it was hoped that a sufficiently strong attack
would lure the Imperial Fleet east in response.
The carrier groups were not to commit to
an all-out attack against Japanese bases,
however, just raise a ruckus and retire eastwards.
Kimmel realized that the entire Japanese
navy would not storm after the carriers—they
would clearly be busy undertaking the offensive
elsewhere—but he hoped “important
units” would go east either to attack
the raiding force, or knock out advance bases
such as Guam, Wake Island, and perhaps Midway.
If the Imperial Navy took the bait, the fleeing
carriers would rendezvous with a support
force of battleships and come about for a
counter-attack against their pursuers (Yamamoto
himself would try a similar ruse after the
loss of his own carriers at the Battle of
Midway). Additionally, the U.S. Battle Force
would sortie if the chance for a “decisive
battle” was in the offing (fuel requirements
made it impossible to have the Battle Force
simply “mill about” in hopes
of a decisive encounter).
This plan is noteworthy in several respects.
The U.S. did ultimately react to the Japanese
attack with raids into the Marshall Islands,
and the carriers did prove capable of defending
themselves from the land-based air present
there. The forward deployment of three battleships
with a very small screen was risky: Until
they linked up with the carriers they would
clearly be susceptible to attack by submarine
(one suspects Kimmel did not want to risk
missing a fleet action, and in truth, Admiral
Pye was an able subordinate to lead the Battle
Force). Also of interest, the plan does not
speculate much on the Japanese response other
than to hope “important,” but
undefined, units of the Imperial Fleet would
respond.
By way of comparison, the Japanese strategy
up until the planning of the Pearl Harbor
attack is well known: Wait in the west for
the U.S. offensive, perform attrition with
light units and airpower, and shatter the
U.S. Fleet in a decisive battle far from
its bases. Had the Japanese command rejected
the Pearl Harbor attack, this strategy might
have very well prevailed, and the WPPac-46
offensive would have struck air; the Imperial
Navy simply would have not responded in any
appreciable force, and certainly not with “important
units.” However, Admiral Yamamoto—assuming
he was still in command—held strong
views that the U.S. fleet should be destroyed
as early and far east as possible.
Plan WPPac-46 plan appears in
our Second
World War at Sea: Midway Deluxe Edition game, where you can allow Yamamoto
to take the opportunity for a early, decisive,
battle with the Pacific Fleet.
You can order Midway Deluxe right here.
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