| The Vickers
in South Africa’s War
By David Hughes
December 2012
The endless pop-pop-pop-pop-pop sound of supporting
Vickers guns gave confidence to British infantrymen in two
world wars. Modified from the Maxim gun (shown in
Infantry Attacks), it entered service
in 1912 and remained on strength for the next 56 years.
Lighter and more reliable than the Maxim, the Vickers retained
the key features of a water-cooled rifle-calibre barrel fed
by 250 round belts. Its specialty was sustained long-range
fire. During the First World War it often fired for hours
at a time, stopping only to change barrels every 30 to 45
minutes.
During the Second World War the Vickers received
a new cartridge that allowed it to shoot accurately at up
to 4,500 yards. The British swore by it, claiming that it
that it was the best defensive infantry weapon around —
the German MG 42 might have had a much faster firing rate
(twice the 600 rpm of the Vickers), but it had to fire in
bursts and needed to change barrels.
However, on the offensive it was a different story. When moved,
each gun needed one man to carry the barrel, a second the
tripod and a third the water-evaporator, not to mention ammunition
belts and gallons of water. As a result, a four-gun platoon
would be hard pressed to move even two guns forward with the
advancing infantry. Unless, that is, it was a South African
infantry battalion.
Such battalions had a shortage of trained soldiers and lots
of untrained labourers. Mike Bennighof provided an outline
of the South Africans in action in his preview of South Africa’s
War. In those days there were four, often mutually opposed,
population groups in the dominion. At the top were the English-speaking
whites, endlessly squabbling with the Afrikaaner (a dialect
of Dutch) whites, usually known as Boers. The latter still
passionately resented their defeat in the Boer War and the
majority had no interest in supporting the British in their
war against Germany. They had a lot of political power and
pushed a motion to keep South Africa neutral during the war.
This was only just defeated, by a vote of 80 to 67.
As a result the Boer contribution to the infantry was minimal,
with only three Afrikaaner units seeing action in Africa:
2nd Battalion Regiment Botha, Regiment President Steyn, and
Regiment de Middellandse. In contrast, sixteen English battalions
fought in Africa. When it came time to send troops to Italy
the contribution was equally limited, being a mere two rifle
companies in the converged Witwatersland Rifles-Regiment De
la Rey battalion. The Boers instead emphasised their “commando”
tradition of light horsemen, forming a large and utterly useless
collection of cavalry detachments which were slowly converted
into armoured car battalions and regiments.
There were two other population groups, the blacks (today
one employs more respectful terms, but not then, in the homeland
of apartheid)—the vast majority of the population but
marginalised from political and economic power—and the
“coloureds”. This was a term used to describe
people originating from India and elsewhere in Asia (Ghandi
was a famous example) and those of “mixed birth,”
the descendents of white-and-black couples.
In theory this formed a very useful manpower source, but racial
fears put a stop to that. Nothing terrified a South African
government more than the thought of “natives with guns.”
Indeed, they would not even allow battalions of the King’s
African Rifles (British colonial infantry from Kenya) to enter
the country unless they were first disarmed. Naturally this
demand was treated with the contempt it deserved.
All this meant that the South African infantry was always
short of men, which leads us back to the story of their Vickers
guns. In theory, a South African battalion with a ration strength
of over 900 men should be stronger than a British battalion
of 850, but in reality its fighting capability was much less.
Over 200 of the South Africans were “non-white,”
which meant that they were useless for combat purposes as
they could not legally be armed (although in truth a few sensible
commanders gave them guns and hoped that no politician would
turn up!).
The “white” strength of 33 officers and 647
men allowed for only three rifle companies, one less than
normal, organised the same way and with similar equipment.
The fourth rifle company was replaced by a support company.
This had the usual mortar platoon but added several Vickers
MMG platoons. The standard was two platoons for a total of
eight guns, but battalions tended to increase their machine-gun
strength.
In the period after the scenarios in South
Africa’s War the South African infantry took
on a markedly defensive tone, with their anti-tank and especially
machine-gun strength boosted dramatically. A good example is
the Cape Town Highlanders in late 1942, recorded as having no
fewer than 22 Vickers machine guns in their support company.
This was made possible by using the large number of “non-whites”
who could be pressed into service to bring up the large amounts
of ammunition and water needed by the guns. As a result each
gun could be manned and moved with only two or three white soldiers
involved. At the same time the three rifle companies were reduced
to less than 100 riflemen each.
An example of just how effective the Vickers could be on
defence is shown in Scenario 9 of South Africa’s
War, when the Afrika Korps overran the southern face
of the 5th South African Brigade box, across flat, open terrain
in which the Vickers excelled. Both battalions along the southern
half of the box, the South African Irish and 2nd Battalion
Botha, deployed 12 Vickers, backed up by another eight from
3rd Company Regiment President Steyn (the divisional machine-gun
battalion). The result, adding to the fire from the battalion
Bren guns, was devastating losses among the attacking German
rifle and Italian berseglieri battalions, perilously exposed
in their trucks and cars. No wonder the Germans remembered
the battle as “Totensonntag” —
the Sunday of the Dead.
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