| Midway:
First Defeat
By David H. Lippman
June 2008
Near the battered carrier Hiryu, the battleship
Kirishima stands ready to tow Hiryu if the
carrier’s engines close down. But Hiryu is immobile, and her fires are blazing, making
the carrier and her escorts highly visible
targets. Kirishima Capt. Sanji Iwabuchi radios
Nagumo, pointing out the danger to the battleship.
At 6:37, Nagumo orders Kirishima to break
off and rejoin the flag. The battleship sails
northwest. Her XO, Capt. Honda, stares back
at Hiryu, black against the evening sky,
fires burning in every porthole. The pinpoints
of flame, he says later, remind him of lanterns
strung on holidays at home.
All four Japanese carriers are facing disaster
now. At 7 p.m., the fires ripping up Soryu seem to be easing up. The carrier has an
audience of two destroyers and an American
PBY. With the fires dying, the ranking survivor
rounds up a firefighting party, intending
to reboard the carrier. Then a massive explosion
from Soryu sends a spear of ruby flame into
the evening sky. Everybody knows what this
means. On Makigumo, someone starts singing “Kimigayo,” and
Soryu starts to sink, at 30° 38’N,
179° 13’W. A sailor yells, “Soryu
banzai!” The 18,000-ton aircraft carrier’s
stern quietly dips below the water at 7:13
p.m. About 10 minutes later, an undersea
explosion rumbles the waves around the destroyers.
Seven hundred and eighteen men perish with
Soryu.
At 7:05, Nagumo gives up. He orders what’s
left of the Striking Force to flee northwest,
an order without precedent in the history
of the Imperial Japanese Navy. He is fleeing
the scene of battle.
At 7 p.m., two massive explosions rip Kaga, and she leaps out of the sea. Then she plops
back into the water, slowly sinking. At 7:25,
still on an even keel, she goes to the bottom,
at position 30° 20’N, 179° 17’W.
800 of her men go down with her. Her escorts
race off with their wounded. Sixteen minutes
later, Nautilus surfaces, batteries and crew
exhausted from 42 depth charges, to find
the water empty.
On the American ships, exhaustion has finally
taken over. Yorktown still stands drifting
and deserted, guarded by Hughes. If enemy
ships turn up, Hughes is to sink Yorktown to prevent her capture. The abandoned carrier
looks bizarre to Hughes’ bridge crew.
They see what looks like lights flickering
from the wreck, and think they can hear voices
coming from the abandoned carrier. Hughes’ Cdr.
Ramsey considers lowering a boat to find
out, but thinks that would just create trouble.
The mysterious noises give rise to later
legends that the ghosts of Yorktown crewmen
who never escaped haunt her successor’s
engine room.
Task Force 16 is also enduring a sad and
spectral evening. Aviators shuffle down to
Hornet’s wardroom for dinner, and stare
at 29 empty chairs belonging to Torpedo 8.
On Enterprise, Ensign Charles Lane, a Yorktown orphan, is offered the cabin of a Torpedo
6 pilot who hasn’t come back. Lane
walks in and immediately sees the aviator’s
family pictures and a Bible lying on his
desk. It’s almost too much to bear.
RM3 John W. Snowden, of Scouting 6, also
scans the empty bunks in his berthing compartment,
feeling overwhelmingly depressed, having
lost so many good friends.
Up on the flag bridge, however, Spruance
has no time to contemplate his losses. His
staff—mostly Halsey’s—want
him to sail west, and be in position to either
deliver a night torpedo attack or a dawn
dive-bomber attack, to polish off the remaining
Japanese strength.
Spruance disagrees. He is extremely aware
that his depleted task force is the only
American combat strength standing between
the Japanese and Hawaii. Despite Japan’s
fearful losses, they still have a vast and
powerful fleet, including seven battleships,
led by Yamamoto himself. Spruance is certainly
aware that his air strength has been badly
depleted by the day’s action, with
crushing losses to his torpedo squadrons.
Spruance is probably aware that his ships
and men are technically and tactically inferior
to the Japanese in a surface night engagement.
His carriers are useless in a surface battle.
While his cruisers have TBS radio and radar,
Japanese binoculars and well-trained lookouts
outrange American radar. Japanese cruisers
pack the deadly Long Lance torpedo, the world’s
finest, which outranges the often ineffective
American Mark 14s. Japanese night-fighting
tactics are well-developed and have been
tested in battle. None of the American ships
have fought a surface action yet.
To head west, Spruance believes, is folly.
In his report to Nimitz, Spruance writes, “I
did not feel justified in risking a night
encounter with possibly superior enemy forces,
but on the other hand, I did not want to
be too far away from Midway next morning.
I wished to be in a position from which either
to follow up retreating enemy forces, or
to break up a landing attack on Midway.”
Most importantly for Spruance: His mission
is not to pursue the Japanese fleet, but
to protect the island. He fears that if he
continues his chase of wrecked carriers,
the Japanese invasion fleet will simply sneak
up and land on the battered island anyway.
Spruance wants to be position to protect
the island with his aircraft. Spruance is
under orders to hold Midway, and not to jeopardize
his fleet, particularly the irreplaceable
aircraft carriers.
At 7:09 p.m., Spruance orders Task Force
16 east until midnight, keeping his distance
from Yamamoto’s ships.
At 7:15 p.m., Cdr. K. Tampo, Akagi’s
chief engineer, finishes a brave climb from
the engine room through burning, smoking
decks, to inform Aoki that there is no hope
of operating the carrier under her own power.
That’s it, then. Aoki orders Tampo’s
engine crew topside, and sends a messenger.
The messenger never returns. Neither does
the black gang.
Next, Aoki asks Nagumo for permission to
evacuate his ship. Nagumo grants it at once.
The crew starts evacuating at 8 p.m., finishing
around 10 p.m. 500 evacuees are jammed onto
Arashi and 200 on Nowake.
While all this is going on, Yamamoto fires
off a morale-boosting message to his entire
fleet at 7:15 p.m. It reads as follows:
The enemy fleet, which has practically been
destroyed, is retiring to the east.
Combined Fleet units in the vicinity are
preparing to pursue the remnants and at the
same time, to occupy AF.
The Main Body is scheduled to reach 32° 08’ N,
175° 45’ E at 0300 on the 5th,
Course 90°; speed 20.
The First Carrier Striking Force, Invasion
Force (less Cruiser Division 7) and Submarine
Force will immediately contact and destroy
the enemy.
Nagumo starts digesting these words just
as he receives the message that Soryu has
gone down.
The ocean where four mighty Japanese aircraft
carriers lie blazing is also full of swimmers.
Most are orphaned combat air patrol pilots
who have lost their ships: Raita Ogawa from
Akagi treads water in his life jacket. Tatsuya
Otawa from Soryu clutches a piece of timber.
Takayoshi Morinaga of Kaga hangs on to a
floating hammock. Some are hauled in by destroyers,
but others are not, and can only watch as
the destroyers give up their search and race
off in the dark.
One other swimmer is trying to avoid being
picked up—George Gay, trying to hide
under his black cushion. With a burned leg
and bleeding hand, he is in no shape for
an extended stay in the water. At darkness,
he finally inflates his yellow life raft,
and struggles into it to rest, watching searchlights
to the north, around the wrecked Hiryu.
Hiryu is
struggling to survive. At 9 p.m., the destroyer Makigumo radios
Nagumo, “Hiryu
can attain 28 knots.” However,
nobody on the bridge can see where the ship
is going, because the forward elevator is
lying against it. A burning hammock mantelet
forces Kaku, Yamaguchi, and their staffs
down to the flight deck, port side aft of
the bridge. They can see the fires on the
forward flight deck melting steel rivets
like snow.
Around the same time, the destroyer Kazagumo moves alongside Hiryu, and the destroyer
crews unload firefighting equipment and the
first food the crew has seen since breakfast,
hardtack and water. The destroyer Yugumo brings up fire hoses from Chikuma. Next,
Makigumo arrives to take the wounded.
At 9:30, Nagumo radios Yamamoto with the
report about the vast enemy force Chikuma has reported. “Total enemy strength
is five carriers, six heavy cruisers, and
15 destroyers. We are steaming westward.
We are retiring to the northwest escorting
Hiryu. Speed 18 knots.” No answer.
Shortly after 10 p.m., Aoki radios Nagumo,
asking permission to scuttle Akagi. Yamato
picks up this message, and Yamamoto and Ugaki
are reluctant to scuttle the great carrier,
which is Yamamoto himself once commanded.
Akagi is more than a name (“Red Castle” in
Japanese). She is the embodiment of Japanese
naval and air power, the flagship of the
carrier fleet. Huge, unwieldy, and converted
from a battlecruiser hull, Akagi’s
funnel smoke constantly seeps into crew quarters.
She is one of two carriers in the world with
her bridge structure on the port side (Hiryu is the other). But she is a sentimental favorite
in the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Yamamoto orders Nagumo at 10:25 to hold
off on scuttling Akagi. Aoki reacts by lashing
himself to the anchor chain, so that he won’t
float away when Akagi sinks.
At 10:50, Nagumo amplifies his message to
Yamamoto. This time, Nagumo gets an answer
in five minutes. He’s relieved of command.
Kondo and his battleships will take over.
Ugaki’s reaction is similar to those
of Yamamoto’s staff: “The Nagumo
Force has no stomach for a night engagement!”
Nagumo takes the message calmly. He probably
has little emotional strength left. Nagumo’s
staff, having had time to do little but brood
over catastrophe, does react. Senior staff
officer Captain Oishi goes to Kusaka, and
says, “Sir, we staff officers have
all decided to commit suicide to fulfill
our own responsibility for what has happened.
Would you please inform Admiral Nagumo?”
Kusaka is outraged. He hauls the whole staff
into his tiny cabin on Nagara, and bellows
at them, “How can you do such a thing?
You go into raptures over any piece of good
news; then say you’re going to commit
suicide the first time anything goes wrong.
It’s absurd!”
Then he takes a piggyback ride to Nagumo
to report the incident. The boss is considering
seppuku himself. Kusaka tries the same argument,
in a more deferential tone. Nagumo listens,
and broods. “What you say is certainly
reasonable, but things are different when
it’s a question of the chief.”
“Not at all,” Kusaka says. He
repeats his point: It is nothing but weakness
to commit hara-kiri right now.
“Very well,” Nagumo says. “I
will not commit any rash act.”
While rescue efforts go on, Hiryu loses
power. Most engine rooms are blazing. In
Engine Room No. 4, Cdr. Aisume takes a phone
call from the bridge (more likely damage
control central, as the bridge has been abandoned).
Can the engineers get out? Aisume looks up
at the red-hot steel overhead and says no.
After a long pause, the bridge asks if the
men have any last messages. Aisume is infuriated.
He tells the bridge not to give up. Doesn’t
help. The phone goes dead.
In all likelihood, Aisume is talking to
Cdr. Takeo Kyuma, the staff engineering officer,
who actually wants to get his men out. He
yells down through a voice tube, “Hold
on, hold on!” Someone answers, “Nothing
particular to be reported.” Then nothing
more. Kyuma assumes everyone is dead. Actually,
they’ve just moved to a compartment
without a voice tube.
Gloomy, Kyuma stumps back to the flag staff
and suggests to Senior Staff Officer Ito
that they get Yamaguchi off to safety, by
force if necessary.
“Even if we take him off the ship
by force now, I am sure the strong-willed
admiral would kill himself later, as he has
so firmly made up his mind to remain with
the ship,” replies Ito. “The
thoughtful way would be to let him do as
he wishes.” So all the staff officers
volunteer to stay behind, and ask Ito to
inform Yamaguchi of this collective decision.
Yamaguchi refuses. “I am very pleased
and touched by your staff’s desire
to remain with me,” he says, “But
you young men must leave the ship. This is
my order.”
At 11:58, something sets off a major explosion,
which in turn flares up the fires. Hiryu cannot last much longer.
Meanwhile, Kondo and his battleships and
cruisers charge northeast. At 11:40, Kondo radios that he expects to be in position
at 3 a.m., and that his line of ships will
sweep for the American fleet. Neither side
knows it, but if Spruance had continued west,
he would run straight into Kondo’s
battleships and cruisers.
However, Yamamoto is concerned about the
timing. If Kondo can’t attack until
3 a.m., then he’ll only have two hours
until dawn. At that time, Kondo’s whole
force will be open to American air attack
and more slaughter. Kurita’s cruisers,
set to bombard Midway, won’t be in
position until nearly dawn.
There is no advice—or orders—from
Tokyo. The Naval General Staff is listening
to the battle on their radios, but Adm. Osami
Nagano, the Chief of Staff, will not overrule
Yamamoto. The battle is Yamamoto’s
to fight, and Yamamoto’s alone.
Yamamoto orders Kuroshima and Watanabe to
start drafting an order to recall the fleet,
cancelling Operation AF. All forces will
retreat to a point 350 miles northwest of
Midway to rendezvous with Yamamoto, transfer
casualties, and return to Japan.
The staff is stunned. Defeat is a catastrophe
that has never befallen the Imperial Japanese
Navy until this day. Watanabe suggests that
the Main Body’s battleships sail up
to Midway, bombard the island with their
16-inch and 18-inch guns, and pound it into
submission. Kuroshima agrees, and the two
put the scheme to Yamamoto and Ugaki.
Yamamoto absorbs the presentation, and says, “I
am sure you have studied in the Naval Staff
College that Navy history teaches us not
to fight against land forces with naval vessels.”
“Yes, I know,” says an embarrassed
Watanabe.
“Your proposal is against fundamental
naval doctrine,” Yamamoto continues, “and
it is too late now for such an operation.
This battle is almost coming to an end. In
shogi too much fighting causes all-out defeat.
One can lose everything.”
Ugaki pipes up, “You ought to know
very well the absurdity of attacking a fortress
with the guns of a fleet. Even powerful battleships
would be defeated by enemy air forces and
submarines before they could make an effective
bombardment in a situation such as exist
where there are quite strong land-based air
forces operating from an undamaged base,
as well as a still powerful carrier air force.
We had better wait for the Second Carrier
Striking Force, if the Invasion Force can
stay long enough."
“Furthermore, we can have hopes for
subsequent operations, because we will have
eight carriers, including those expected
to be completed soon, though we have lost
four carriers in this operation. It is the
plan of a fool without a brain, to challenge
a hopeless game of go again and again out
of desperation."
Watanabe and Kuroshima are out of ideas.
For a few minutes, all the staff officers
argue possible hare-brained solutions. Yamamoto
says nothing. Finally, someone asks, almost
hysterically, “But how can we apologize
to His Majesty for this defeat?”
Yamamoto speaks up, cold and firm. “Leave
that to me. I am the only one who must apologize
to His Majesty.”
Get
in on the action! Click
here to order Midway:
Turning Point in the Pacific TODAY!
David H. Lippman, an award-winning journalist
and graduate of the New School for Social Research,
has written many magazine articles about World
War II. He maintains the World
War II + 55 website and currently works
as a public information officer for the city
of Newark, N.J. We're pleased to add his work
to our Daily Content. |